An important tool for proving the safety of dynamical systems is the notion of a barrier certificate. In this paper, we prove that every robustly safe ordinary differential equation has a barrier certificate. Moreover, we show a construction of such a barrier certificate based on a set of states that is reachable in finite time.
3) U ⊆ R n (the set of unsafe states).
The vector field f defines an ordinary differential equation whose solution we will describe using the flow of f .
Definition 2: For a smooth f : R n → R n , and t ∈ R, we denote the state that systemẋ = f (x) reaches after time t from x by ϕ f (x, t) .
Note that we also allow t to be negative, and we have ϕ(x, t) = y iff ϕ(y, −t) = x.
Based on the flow ϕ, we introduce the following notation for sets of reachable states.
Definition 3: For a smooth f : R n → R n , for sets X ⊆ R n and
Here, if clear from the context, we will drop the subscript f . Definition 4: A safety verification problem (f, I, U ) is safe iff R f (I) ∩ U = ∅.
In this paper, we are interested in objects that can serve as evidence that a given safety verification problem is safe. One possibility of such objects is the following.
Definition 5: A set V ⊆ R n is a safety certificate of a safety verification problem (f, I, U ) iff
A set that fulfills the first two conditions is also called inductive invariant by the verification community, and a positively invariant set by the dynamical systems literature [5] , [7] .
Safety certificates serve as a proof of safety. Property 1: If a safety verification problem (f, I, U ) has a safety certificate, then it is safe.
Safety certificates are also complete, that is, there is a converse of Property 1.
Property 2: If a safety verification problem (f, I, U ) is safe, then it has a safety certificate R R ≥ 0 f (I). The definitions presented above are not robust against small changes of the safety verification problem. For example, a safety verification problem might have a safety certificate, but tiny changes of the safety verification problem might result in it not being safe. In order to avoid this, we use robust analogies of the definitions mentioned above. Here, we measure the deviation from nominal behavior by the Euclidean norm, denoted by || · ||.
We use the following robust versions of the reach sets introduced in Definition 3.
Definition 7: For a smooth f : R n → R n , for sets X ⊆ R n and
Again, if clear from the context, we will drop the subscript f . Also Definition 4 has a robust version. Definition 8: A safety verification problem (f, I, U ) is robustly safe iff there is ε > 0 such that R f ,ε (I) ∩ U = ∅. We will call ε > 0 fulfilling this property a robustness margin of (f, I, U ).
We also provide a robust version of Definition 5. Definition 9: A set V ⊆ R n is an ε-robust safety certificate of a safety verification problem (f,
We call a safety certificate V robust iff there is ε > 0 such that V is an ε-robust safety certificate.
There is a robust version of Property 1. Property 3: If a safety verification problem (f, I, U ) has a robust safety certificate, then it is robustly safe.
Also completeness holds in analogy to Property 2, that is, there is a converse of Property 3.
Property 4: If a safety verification problem (f, I, U ) is robustly safe, then it has a robust safety certificate R R ≥0 f ,ε (I), where ε is a robustness margin of (f, I, U ).
Safety certificates have the disadvantage that checking them still needs the computation of some reachable set. This can be avoided by the following definition.
Definition 10 (Prajna and Jadbabaie [10] ): A differentiable function β : R n → R is a barrier certificate of a safety verification problem
Also barrier certificates serve as a proof of safety. Property 5: If a safety verification problem (f, I, U ) has a barrier certificate, then it is safe.
Converse theorems for this property are an active area of research [11] , [12] , [16] , and at the same time, the main topic of this paper.
Summarizing Definitions 5, 9, and 10 provide three different forms of certificates for safety verification problems, as ensured by corresponding Properties 1, 3, and 5, respectively. The contributions of this paper are converse theorems for the latter two cases. The state-of-the-art is: 1) For Definition 9, there is a very simple converse theorem of corresponding Property 3. This converse theorem is Property 4, which has the disadvantage of being based on an infinite-time reach set. 2) For Definition 10, it is known that the literal converse of corresponding Property 5 does not hold, that is, there are safety verification problems that are safe, but do not have a barrier certificate [14, Example 3] . Still, there are partial converse theorems [12] , [16] .
The most general result [16] proves a converse for Morse-Smale vector fields under the assumption of robustness. The main result of this paper is a converse theorem of Property 5 that still assumes robustness, but is not restricted to Morse-Smale vector fields.
Theorem 1: Assume a safety verification problem (f, I, U ) that is robustly safe, such that the closures of I and U is disjoint, and the set of safe states R n \ U is bounded. Then, the safety verification problem has a barrier certificate.
The second result is the following converse of Property 4 that is based on a finite time reach set.
Theorem 2: If a safety verification problem (f, I, U ) is robustly safe with robustness margin ε and the set of safe states R n \ U is bounded, then for all
is an ε 2 -robust safety certificate. In the following section, we first summarize some facts that directly follow from the literature. Then, in Section IV, we prove Theorem 1, and in Section V, Theorem 2. Section VI concludes the paper.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we summarize some facts that directly follow from the literature. We first relate the notion of an ε-solution to controllability.
Property 6: Given a smooth f :
. Hence, we can apply results from controllability to our context. The following property directly follows from this.
Property 7: Given an ordinary differential equationẋ
. The usual proof of (a generalization of) this property [9, Proposition 3.3], [13, Proposition 11.2] uses the inverse function theorem to map each point p * in the neighborhood of p to a vector ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n that generates an input of the form needed by Property 6 to steer the system into p * . Due to a version of the inverse function theorem [6, Th. 2.9.4] that bounds the size of this neighborhood from below based on a Lipschitz constant for the derivative of the given function, the size δ of the neighborhood in Property 7 can be bounded from below over all elements p and p of a compact set.
Lemma 1: Given an ordinary differential equationẋ = f (x) with smooth f : R n → R n , and a compact set Ω ⊆ R n . Then, for every
IV. ROBUST CONVERSE THEOREM FOR BARRIER CERTIFICATES
In this section, we will prove Theorem 1. Throughout the section, we will assume a safety verification problem (f, I, U ) that fulfills the premises of this theorem: robust safety, disjointness of the closures of I and U , and boundedness of the set of safe states R n \ U . We will denote by μ the robustness margin of (f, I, U ), and by V a μ-robust safety certificate whose existence is ensured by Property 4. We will construct a barrier certificate from the boundary ∂cl(V ) of the closure of V . We will first prove that the solutions of f starting in ∂cl(V ) do not have any further intersection with ∂cl(V )-even in reverse time.
Lemma 2:
Proof: By the definition of R R f (∂cl(V )), there is at least one such t. It suffices to prove that there is not more than one. For this we assume that there are t 1 and t 2 such that t 1 = t 2 , and both ϕ f (x, t 1 ) and ϕ f (x, t 2 ) are in ∂cl(V ). Without loss of generality assume that t 1 < t 2 . Lett be such that t 1 <t < t 2 .
Then
. Therefore, by Property 7, there is a neighborhood of ϕ(x, t 2 ) such that every point in this neighborhood is μ-reachable from ϕ(x,t). The same argument applied in reverse time to t 1 andt ensures a neighborhood of ϕ(x, t 1 ) such that ϕ(x,t) is μ-reachable from every point in this neighborhood. Let x 1 be in the neighborhood of ϕ(x, t 1 ) such that x 1 ∈ V , and let x 2 be in the neighborhood of ϕ(x, t 2 ) such that x 2 ∈ V . Then, there is a μ-solution from x 1 ∈ V over ϕ f (x,t) to x 2 ∈ V . This is in contradiction to the fact that V is a μ-robust safety certificate.
We will now introduce a function ν(x) from which we will later obtain the barrier certificate by smooth approximation. Let ν(x) be such that ν(x) is defined on R R f (∂cl(V )) and such that ν(x) := −t with t being the unique t with ϕ f (x, t) ∈ ∂cl(V ) ensured by Lemma 2. Note that ν(x) is positive for all points of the interior of V for which it is defined, and negative for all points of the complement of the closure of V for which it is defined. Moreover, ∂cl(V ) is in the interior of the domain of definition of ν. Due to the definition of ν, we also have the following property.
In general, functions defined based on the length of solutions leading to some set are not continuous. But using the robustness of V, we will be able to prove continuity.
Lemma 3: The function ν is continuous in an open neighborhood of ∂cl(V ).
Before formally proving this lemma, we explain the idea of the proof. We assume that ν is not continuous let us say at a point x, and derive a contradiction. Let y be the point where the solution from x enters V . Then, due to noncontinuity, the situation shown in Fig. 1 arises: There is a point x close to x such that the solution from x enters a close neighborhood of y (pointŷ), but then enters V at a different point further away. Letting y be close to that entrance point but still outside of V, we can perturb the trajectory fromŷ to y by movingŷ to y. The resulting trajectory leads from y to y and hence leaves V, which is a contradiction to V being a robust safety certificate.
The figure illustrates the situation where x ∈ V , but we do not assume this in the proof by exploiting the fact that the flow ϕ also allows negative time.
Proof: The function ν being continuous in an open neighborhood of ∂cl(V ) means that for all elements x of this neighborhood, for all ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 s.t. for all x with ||x − x|| < δ, |ν(x ) − ν(x)| < ε. We assume noncontinuity of ν in every open neighborhood of ∂cl(V ) and derive a contradiction.
Since the set of states R n \ U is bounded and the safety verification problem (f, I, U ) is robustly safe, the safety certificate V is bounded, too. Let N be an open, but bounded, neighborhood of ∂cl(V ). Due to our assumption, ν is noncontinuous in N , that is, there is
Since N is open, but bounded, cl(N ) is compact. Now letδ + be the constant ensured by Lemma 1 after choosing Ω as cl(N ), ε as μ 2 , and Δ as the constant ε chosen above. Letδ ({p}). We note these properties and refer to them below by ( * ) + , and ( * ) − .
Since the flow ϕ is continuous, we can choose δ s.t. for all x with ||x − x || < δ, ||ϕ(x, −ν(x)) − ϕ(x , −ν(x))|| <δ. Due to our assumption of noncontinuity of ν, for this δ, there is x
Let y := ϕ f (x, −ν(x)),ŷ := ϕ f (x , −ν(x)), y := ϕ f (ŷ, sgn (ν(x) − ν(x ))ε). Then, ||y −ŷ|| <δ, and y = ϕ f (ϕ f (x , −ν(x)),
We have two cases:
Since and ν(y ) ≤ 0. Hence, y ∈ cl(V ) and y ∈ int(V ).
Since cl(V ) and y ∈ int(V ). In both cases, we have a μ 2 -solution from a point in cl(V ) to a point not in int(V ). Hence, using the same construction as in the second part of the proof of Lemma 2 mentioned above, one gets a μ-solution from a point in V to a point not in V, which is a contradiction to the fact that V is a μ-robust safety certificate.
Using the notation
we now remind the reader of a classical result by Wilson [15, Th. 2.5] , and for the reader's convenience, we state here a direct corollary. Lemma 4: If h is a continuous real-valued function on a compact set N , f is a nonsingular vector field on N , and L f h is defined on N and continuous, then for every ε > 0, there exists a C ∞ -function
Based on this, we can now construct a robust barrier certificate from a robust safety certificate. 
Furthermore, due to continuity of ν, we can use Lemma 4 to construct a C ∞ -function ν such that for all x ∈ N δ
and
Then, for all
Now let X = (X α ) α ∈A be an open cover of R n indexed by a set A. Assume furthermore, that for all α ∈ A, X α contains a common element with at most one of the sets N δ
Let (ψ α ) α ∈A be a partition of unity [8, ch. 2] subordinate to X and
Since (ψ α ) α ∈A is a partition of unity, β is smooth. Since for all α ∈ A, for all x ∈ N δ , (L f β)(x) > 0. Moreover, β is strictly positive on I, and strictly negative on U . Hence, β is a robust barrier certificate.
Theorem 1 follows as a corollary.
V. FINITE TIME CONVERSE THEOREM FOR SAFETY CERTIFICATES
The construction in the previous section was based on a robust safety certificate V whose existence is ensured by Property 4. However, this property has the disadvantage of being based on an infinite time reach set. We will remove this disadvantage by proving Theorem 2 in the next section.
The proof extends a technique introduced by Fränzle [3] , that he originally used for proving existence of a barrier for hybrid systems with polynomial flow: Take the bloated finite-time reach set R [0,t] f ,ε (I), and show that the original dynamics is shrinking on it if the bloated reach set does not grow beyond the bounded complement of U . However, here we have additional complications: First, our flow is, in general, not polynomial (note that even linear ordinary differential equations usually have a nonpolynomial flow), and second, we are not satisfied with a barrier, but we want a robust barrier.
Before the actual proof, we note the following. Lemma 6: Let V ⊆ R n , Δ > 0 such that f ,ε (I) with ε-perturbed dynamics. So we choose p i + 1 = p , t i + 1 = t i + Δ. Then, p i + 1 ∈ R [0,t i ] f ,ε (I) and hence has distance at least δ from p 1 , . . . , p i . Moreover, every point not reachable in time t i + 1 again has distance at least δ from p 1 , . . . , p i + 1 .
We choose t 1 = 0 and p 1 an initial point that has distance at least δ from the boundary of the set of initial points I (the case where such a point does not exist can be easily handled by shifting the sequence).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proved a robust converse theorem for barrier certificates, removing restrictions of such theorems in the literature. Moreover, we proved that a certain finite time reach set of a robustly safe system always forms a robust safety certificate. The literature contains several variants of the notion of a barrier certificate [4] , [14] . We propose a comprehensive converse theory covering those variants as a goal for the future work in the area.
The actual computation of barrier certificates [1] , [2] , [17] , [18] is an essential question that deserves further attention.
